

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY ON COUNTERDRUGS**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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There are those throughout our country that say we are gaining positive headway toward the counterdrug effort and that our government should begin to focus its efforts elsewhere. Others take the alternative view; that drug abuse is still prevalent and is actually increasing. Those with this second opinion believe the federal government should do more to curb this nationwide problem that is effecting the well-being of our citizens. Specifically, advocates of this latter viewpoint believe the Department of Defense (DOD) could and should do more to keep our borders free from the flow of drugs into our nation. As the DOD continues to review and redefine the services' roles and missions, some ask that it commit more of its resources to the nations' counterdrug effort. Will the mission belong to the active component of each service, or to the National Guard or Reserve forces? Or, will there be a mixture of responsibility throughout the "Total Force?" This paper will provide a brief historical overview on the development of our nations' national counterdrug strategy, and review the basic components of that strategy through a discussion about the feasibility of its

purported ends, ways, and means. The paper will then address the DOD involvement in the implementation of this strategy, and discuss alternatives and provide recommendations on how this author believes the military should structure itself to fight its piece of the nation's counterdrug effort.

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INTRODUCTION

In his 1997 document delineating the National Security Strategy his administration postulates for America, President Clinton states: "protecting the security of our nation - our people, our territory and our way of life - is my foremost mission and constitutional duty."¹ He goes on to say that "...the dangers we face are unprecedented in their complexity...drugs...are global concerns that transcend national borders..."² To specifically address this problem, President Clinton details the following strategy: "The U.S. response to the global scourge of drug abuse and drug trafficking is to integrate domestic and international efforts to reduce both the demand and the supply of drugs."³

The purpose of this paper is to review the current policy on counterdrug operations; to assess the viability of its ends (as stated above), ways, and means; and to determine the long-term feasibility of this policy out to the year 2010. If insufficient, recommendations for alternative courses of action will follow. To narrow the scope of this broad program, this author will look at one specific area in the overarching counterdrug strategy, the use of Department of Defense (DOD) assets, and provide recommendations for the use of these assets in future counterdrug operations.

THE STRATEGY

In his October 1998 version of A National Security Strategy for a New Century, President Clinton lays the foundation for his administration's fight against the threat of drugs to our nation's sovereignty and way of life.

Protecting our citizens and critical infrastructures at home is an intrinsic and essential element of our security strategy. The dividing line between domestic and foreign policy is increasingly blurred. Globalization enables other states, terrorists, criminals, drug traffickers and others to challenge the safety of our citizens and the security of our borders in new ways. The security challenges wrought by globalization demand close cooperation across all levels of government - federal, state and local - and across a wide range of agencies, including the Departments of Defense and State, the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, emergency services, medical care providers and others.⁴

The ways President Clinton plans to achieve the above stated ends - to reduce both the supply and demand for drugs through the integration of domestic and international efforts - are as follows:

Domestically, we seek to educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs; increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence; reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use; and shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat.⁵

These four broad goals, the ways this administration believes will reduce the supply and demand for drugs in America, and a fifth goal, to break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply, also appear in the National Drug Control Strategy, 1998, a document published by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The ONDCP was established by the passage of The Anti-

Drug Abuse Act of 1988, with the charter to "set priorities, implement a national strategy, and certify federal drug-control budgets."⁶

Annual National Drug Control Strategies since that time have focused primarily on reducing the flow of drugs into our country. Recently, however, "a consensus was reached that drug prevention, education, and treatment must be complemented by supply reduction actions abroad, on our borders, and within the United States."⁷ This theme has been pervasive throughout this administration's National Drug Control Strategies since 1996.

In fact, there is very little difference between the five goals or ways of the 1998 strategy, along with their thirty-two supporting objectives (the means to implement this strategy), and the National Drug Control Strategy his administration published in 1996. What the 1998 strategy does, however, is slightly modify the thirty-two supporting objectives of the five national goals so that today, they are more relevant and applicable to adoption by state and local governments. The measures of effectiveness attached to the thirty-two supporting objectives are achievable by state and local governments without significant funding or direction from the federal government. This allows state governors and city mayors greater leeway in attacking drug abuse in ways that are more applicable to the level of drug abuse in their respective areas.

The aim of the *U.S. National Drug Control Strategy* is to cut drug availability in the United States by half over the next 10 years - and reduce the consequences of drug use and trafficking by 25 percent over the same period - through expanded prevention efforts, improved treatment programs, strengthened law enforcement and tougher interdiction.⁸

SUPPLY VERSUS DEMAND

President Clinton is the first chief executive of our nation to emphasize that prevention, treatment, and education against drug abuse is as important as the policy of interdicting the flow of drugs into America by stopping illicit entry at our borders or by assisting other nations in eradication efforts. Herein lies the debate. Where should ever decreasing fiscal resources be placed - against programs that attack the demand for drugs inside our borders or against programs that attack the supply of drugs overseas and at home? The national policy clearly states that this administration will prosecute the counterdrug effort on both fronts - demand and supply. The next question becomes how much money from our limited pool of discretionary resources should we use to address the supply and demand problem. To answer this we must first look at what programs are available to reduce or eliminate the demand for drugs in our country while simultaneously reducing or eliminating the flow of illicit drugs into America.

Since President Clinton is the first to actively and aggressively attack the demand for drugs in our country, let's take a quick look at some of the demand reduction programs in

effect today that are a direct result of this administration's efforts.

One of this administration's primary goals is to educate America's youth about the dangers of drug use and let them know it's "cool to say no". Not a day goes by when, while watching television or listening to the radio, one doesn't see or hear of teenagers, blue and white collared workers, or sports professionals of every race, creed, gender, and demographic background tell you or show you how they turn down offers to take drugs. This is a powerful incentive to children and people of all ages who may be impressed by the stature of one of these "role models" who they can relate to either by the way they dress, their color, their profession, or the mannerisms they use to express themselves.

The Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program for school children is also an effective demand reduction program. Law enforcement professionals go to the elementary schools and teach our children the bad effects of drug abuse and the benefits of saying "no" when drugs are offered to them. This early education of our children through DARE instruction and subsequent reinforcement of its messages through the anti-drug commercials by "people like me" is a powerful message for our youth. It is the cornerstone to an effective demand reduction effort. Even grandparents are becoming involved.

"The Office of National Drug Control Policy has launched an ad campaign to coax grandparents into talking to their grandchildren about the dangers of drugs. It's part of a larger effort to get adult role models of all sorts to teach kids about addiction, AIDS, and violence."⁹ But it can't stop here, and fortunately, it doesn't.

Programs such as "Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities" also target our youth. The program is "designed to prevent children and adolescents from getting hooked on drugs."¹⁰ Other programs include the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, which "is divided about equally between the treatment as well as the prevention of drug abuse."¹¹

Another, more grass roots, holistic program is Café 458 in Atlanta, Georgia. This program is a non-profit restaurant that was designed and built by volunteers. It centers around one-on-one contact with a few select homeless drug addicts. The counselors treat these people with dignity and respect, providing them food and shelter and rebuilding their self-esteem in return for the counseling they receive about drug and alcohol abuse. The success rate of this program is phenomenal. Nine out of ten participants have no relapses after six months away from the program.¹²

Community organizations are also actively involved in the demand reduction effort. In the state of Pennsylvania, for example, Wendy's restaurant promoted the nationally sponsored

"Red Ribbon Week" campaign "by distributing "Be Drug Free" coupons redeemable for a free beverage, and posting anti-abuse messages in the restaurant and on its marquee." "The McAdoo Community Civic Association collaborated with schools, police and civic groups to heighten awareness of drug and alcohol abuse in the community."¹³ These nationally sponsored and other similar grass roots programs tend to characterize the nation's demand reduction efforts.

While significant, they are only one part of the equation. Most of the programs described above effect only a small percentage of the population. Café 458 is an unquestionably successful program, but it only "treats" ten to twelve people at a time. Similar programs are in place throughout the country. The very nature of a long term in-house care and treatment facility is expensive, and with the ability to effectively treat only ten or twelve people at a time, the cost quickly becomes prohibitive in light of reduced national, state, and local budgets.

As currently applied, supply reduction efforts are no less expensive nor cost effective than the demand reduction efforts discussed above. The difference is that supply reduction efforts are more visible to the general public as a whole, and as a general rule, the results of these programs have international implications. These efforts include the interdiction of drugs at our nation's borders and ports of entry, and at ports of

debarkation from other countries, in the air, and on international waters. They also include domestic and international eradication efforts.

Domestic law enforcement agencies play a significant role in reducing the supply of drugs in our country. Their efforts to arrest, convict, and incarcerate drug offenders can only go so far unless similar efforts are applied to drug producers, manufacturer's, and dealers from other countries. An analysis of of United States and Colombian counterdrug cooperation efforts provides insight to the scope of supply reduction efforts and the international implications they entail.

"In 1995, Colombia remained the world's leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a major supplier of heroin and marijuana."¹⁴ "With U. S. support, joint Colombian police and Army counterdrug initiatives have dismantled drug laboratories, seized large volumes of precursor chemicals, and eradicated thousands of acres of illegal coca and opium fields."¹⁵ Though these steps were significant, not all of our cooperative efforts were as successful. Colombia was decertified as a drug ally because it failed to implement specific agreed upon procedures to reduce the flow of drugs into the United States. Decertification is a process whereby aid is curtailed and the United States can vote against Colombian requests for loans from the World Bank. Additionally, the visas of the Colombian President and other government officials were revoked for their allegedly assisting

known drug traffickers. In 1995, President Clinton issued an Executive Order freezing the assets of over 300 individuals and companies that were determined to be fronts for Colombian drug traffickers. And, with the death or imprisonment of the leaders of the Cali Cartel, the U. S. requested the extradition of its key leaders from prisons in Colombia to the United States, where they could stand trial for importing illegal drugs into our country.¹⁶

Though there are many avenues the nation can pursue to reduce the supply of drugs coming into the United States, the most prevalent are eradication and interdiction. The U. S. military plays a vital role in both of these areas, and will be discussed in greater depth later in the section addressing U.S. military involvement in the counterdrug effort.

TRENDS

In his 1998 State of the Union address, President Clinton said that "crime has dropped for a record five years in a row,"¹⁷ and that "drug use is on the decline."¹⁸ This is, however, a normal occurrence; crime rates usually decline as the economy improves. Statistics recently released by the Justice Department tend to verify this trend.

Overall, the Justice Department said, violent and property crimes have fallen to their lowest levels since 1973, when the victimization survey was started. In fact, the rate of property crime - which includes burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft - has fallen by more than half... Property crime, unlike violent crime, has been dropping steadily since 1975. Among the reasons, experts say, are the aging of the baby-boom population beyond its prime years

of committing crime, the increased use of security alarms and the switch of many criminals from burglary to robbery in the 1980's as a quicker way to make money and buy the crack they needed.¹⁹

Even though the Justice Department states there was a shift from burglaries to robberies as a means for crack users to make money quicker and easier to support their habit, "since 1991...robberies have fallen 32 percent in 1997, according to the FBI." "These are the largest declines for any of the major...property crimes."²⁰

While some may argue that this decline is a result of past efforts to interdict the flow of drugs into our country, others say this decline reflects the efforts of this administration to address drug-related prevention, treatment, and education programs, more so than any other president. Budget data tend to confirm this point. The counterdrug budget has grown "by more than 25 percent since 1992...with the largest one-year increase...in demand reduction efforts, where allocations jumped 22 percent."²¹ In 1998, 33 percent of the counterdrug budget went towards demand reduction efforts while 12 percent was used for international and domestic interdiction or supply reduction efforts. Fifty-five percent was directed toward law enforcement programs, which address both supply and demand efforts.²² Since most law enforcement actions are oriented toward supply reduction efforts, it is plausible to assume from the budget data that the trend is toward providing fairly equal amounts of money to both supply and demand programs.

Therefore, it is safe to assert that this administration's efforts to balance supply and demand funding and substantially increase demand reduction efforts, combined with a burgeoning economy, have impacted positively on the reduction of drug abuse in America.

However, there are some individuals who believe the reduction in our nation's drug abuse rate is not a matter of the economy or funding at all, but rather the result of demographics instead. The current demographic trend indicates a sharp reduction in the number of people in the "drug prone" age group of 15-24 year olds, hence, the reduction in drug use and crime. This author believes that it is a combination of all of the reasons cited above. No one program or reason in and of itself could result in such a dramatic decline in drug abuse as we have witnessed in the 1990's.

Though the present and near-term prognosis is good, current trends portend a bleak future in our nation's counterdrug effort. While addressing the nation on March 12, 1998 at a session announcing the release of anti-drug grants to non-governmental organizations, President Clinton said: "Although overall drug use has dropped by half since 1979,... "drug-abuse trends among young people suggest that half this years' high school seniors will have smoked marijuana by their graduation."²³ He goes on to say: "When we know that drugs lead to crime, to failure in school, to

fraying of families and neighborhoods, we know we must do better."²⁴

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Recent legislation to provide funding for an additional 100,000 civilian police officers, 1,000 new border guards, and up to \$100,000 in separate grants to civil organizations fighting drug abuse, go a long way toward decreasing the problem. Still, much more is needed. The holistic approach offered by the ends, ways, and means depicted in the 1998 National Drug Control Strategy are adequate and all-encompassing. The strategy is sound and has long term implications - at least to 2010. This is especially true as long as the resources currently applied to the nation's counterdrug effort remain at their current levels. One such resource is the use of the nation's Armed Forces as an active means in two of these goals; to shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat, and to break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

In his 1998 National Security Strategy, President Clinton establishes precedence for the use of the U. S. military in the counterdrug effort. "We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors."²⁵ He goes on to say that there are

...vital interests - those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation. Among these are the physical security of our territory...the safety of our citizens... We will do what we must to defend these

interests, including - when necessary - using our military might unilaterally and decisively.²⁶

Our most current National Military Strategy, which derives itself from the National Security Strategy, reaffirms the President's direction to use our nation's military element of power when our vital interests are threatened. "Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal drug-trafficking, and other threats at home or abroad may...require the use of military forces, depending on applicable law..."²⁷ The National Military Strategy goes on to say that "unique military capabilities can also support domestic authorities in combating direct and indirect threats to the US homeland, such as the illegal drug trade..."²⁸

Opponents of military intervention in the counterdrug effort claim the U.S. government is violating the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 by directing U.S. military personnel to actively participate in the interdiction and eradication of illicit drugs, and, when requested, by supporting civilian law enforcement agencies in consonance with the missions outlined below. The Posse Comitatus Act "prohibits the military from participation in police and domestic law enforcement actions."²⁹ However, in 1989, Congress passed into law the Defense Authorization Act. This act "tasked DOD with extensive interdiction and counterdrug missions...and made the DOD the lead agency for detecting and monitoring the drug flow."³⁰ Though this act paved the way for more aggressive and visible military participation in the counterdrug effort, such as

assisting foreign nations, host nation police, and domestic law enforcement agencies in their counterdrug programs, military personnel are still prohibited from actively conducting searches, seizing drugs, and arresting suspected drug traffickers, manufacturers, or users.³¹

"DOD's primary counterdrug mission, although still in support of federal, state, local, and foreign civilian law enforcement agencies (CLEA's), is the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US."³² In 1992 for instance, AWACS from Atlantic Command were permanently dedicated to the Caribbean to monitor the aerial trafficking of drugs across our borders,³³ but military efforts are not limited to maritime and aerial reconnaissance.

Under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (who carries the additional duty of DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support), the Defense Department has established five counterdrug mission areas. These are: Provide counterdrug training, operational, and materiel support to drug-source and drug-transit nations; support the domestic efforts of the US drug law enforcement community; give special support to the international cocaine strategy of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); detect and monitor the air and sea illicit drug transportation networks; and assist with the demand-reduction strategy in local communities and within DOD.³⁴

Clearly, the military is in a supporting role; assisting civilian law enforcement agencies and other organizations in conducting supply and demand reduction activities. And just as clear is the inference that the National Command Authority wants the military deeply involved in the nation's overall counterdrug effort. The

U.S. military, by virtue of its primary mission to fight and win our nation's wars, possesses unique specialties and equipment that enhance domestic and international supply and demand reduction efforts within the mission parameters set forth above.

Overseas, the regional US Commanders-in-Chief are the principal conduits for providing military support to DEA and other US agencies supporting US ambassadors and host-nation counterdrug forces. They support detection, monitoring, and interdiction efforts and provide resources, as available, in those countries where drug production or trafficking is affecting the United States.

On the domestic scene, active and reserve component forces, particularly the National Guard, support a wide range of drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs), including local police and sheriff departments, state bureaus of investigation, and federal agencies such as the US Customs Service, Bureau of Land Management, the DEA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the US Border Patrol. They also support interagency coordination centers like Operation Alliance in El Paso, Texas, and Project North Star in Buffalo, New York; these and similar centers have the mission of helping to guide the application of military resources that support the DLEAs.³⁵

Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) is the military organization responsible for coordinating military support to the CLEAs. It is headquartered at Fort Bliss, Texas, and is a subordinate command of the US Atlantic Command headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia. Here, over 240 active component and full time reserve component soldiers support local law enforcement agencies along our nation's 2,000 mile long Southwest border. They also provide intelligence, surveillance, and engineer support.³⁶ Since 1995, JTF-6 assumed responsibility for counterdrug coordination with all agencies throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. "Currently, priority of effort goes to the

high-intensity drug trafficking areas (HIDTAs), so designated in the National Drug Control Strategy because they are found to be centers of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution that have significant effects on the nation."³⁷

Since the military's domestic role in the counterdrug effort is to support non-military law enforcement agencies, JTF-6 coordinates requests from CLEAs. The requests are then validated by either Operation Alliance or Project North Star as having verified drug related connections. The mission is given to military units who volunteer to participate in drug related missions.

JTF-6 classifies the military support it provides to domestic law enforcement agencies in five categories. Operational Support involves military units conducting mission-related training such as ground reconnaissance and sensor employment, aviation reconnaissance and support, and transportation. General support is the augmentation of law enforcement agencies with military-specific skills, training, transportation, canine support, communications, technology, and communications. Rapid support is the immediate response to actionable intelligence. Intelligence support consists of providing specialists who can assist DLEAs with training and analysis processes. Typical missions include photo imagery interpretation, translator and linguistic support, and analyst support. Engineer support involves road repair and various construction projects. Typical missions include constructing border fences, lighting, and law enforcement training facilities.³⁸

The Total Force is involved in all of these missions.

Reserve Component forces, primarily from the National Guard, commit substantial resources toward the nation's counterdrug effort. Title 32 of the United States Code provides the authority for National Guard forces throughout the fifty states

and the US territories to participate in counterdrug activities in support of non-military law enforcement agencies. "The National Guard, as a state militia, is not subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act while not in federal service. Thus, the Guard has more flexibility than federal forces in conducting counterdrug support operations."³⁹ Additionally, "National Guard forces employed on the domestic scene, unless federalized, operate under state command and control. The various state counterdrug programs are coordinated by the National Guard Bureau, supported and supervised by the DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support."⁴⁰

Together with the National Guard, the military annually provides up to \$1 billion worth of support to the nation's counterdrug effort.⁴¹ This is, in anyone's book, a large sum of money. Many would argue that the military's commitment in equipment and personnel is also excessive.

OPTIONS

However, if it is the will of the American people to continue to curb drug abuse in our country, and through their elected officials provide funding for military involvement, then the Armed Forces should remain engaged in America's counterdrug strategy. But in light of limited funding and decreasing force structure, what are the alternatives?

One would be the legalization of illicit drugs. One such proponent, a retired Air Force officer by the name of Robert

Dowd, states, ..."drug legalization will bring almost immediate relief from the crime, violence, drug killings, corruption, and prison overcrowding that we identify as our 'drug problem'." ⁴² Mr. Dowd goes on to say that the country will witness, ..."less violence on our streets, the disappearance of drug dealers, and a reduced demand for the weapons that juvenile gangs carry to protect their drug enterprise." ⁴³ He further states: ..."the prison population will drop by a third or more," and, ..."the country will quickly develop a positive feeling about the situation, like the relief that the repeal of alcohol prohibition brought to the nation in 1933." ⁴⁴ While the majority of the people and our elected officials may not agree with this option, it is one that is gaining momentum throughout the country as a way to reduce illicit drug use, reduce crime, and reduce the federal spending required to achieve measurable success in the nation's counterdrug effort.

A second alternative would be the total withdrawal of military involvement - all personnel, equipment, and funding - gone. This would reduce the DOD budget up to \$1 billion annually. This money could be spent on other counterdrug programs, specifically in the demand reduction areas such as prevention, treatment, and education. While a plausible solution with potentially positive benefits, it is not a practical solution. Only the military has the ships, planes, and intelligence collection and monitoring assets necessary to affect

a positive impact in the interdiction effort. It also has the personnel resources and experience necessary to train domestic law enforcement agencies and foreign military and law enforcement officials on the intricacies of successful interdiction techniques and subsequent eradication procedures. The costs incurred by other federal or state and local law enforcement agencies to fill this void would far outweigh the benefits of removing the military from their current involvement in the nation's counterdrug effort.

A third alternative would be to increase the military's role in the nations' counterdrug effort, specifically with additional personnel. The 240 active duty personnel responsible for the oversight of military operations along a 2000 mile border leaves a lot of space for drug traffickers to maneuver through and avoid detection, even with our most sophisticated surveillance equipment. Opponents of our nation's "two Major Theater of War" military strategy may be inclined to use units equivalent to a division (of about 15,000) in strength to perform "outpost duty" along our nation's Southwest border. But it is not in the best interest of our nation to maintain a militaristic border with a friendly neighbor and major trading partner.

A better alternative may be a variation of the current use of our Armed Forces. Funding and the use of equipment and intelligence collection efforts should, as a minimum, remain constant. The concept of establishing an agency, most likely

under military control, that will be responsible for "homeland defense," is gaining momentum in the political arenas of our nation. The National Command Authority has already determined the drug threat is a major concern to the integrity of our nation. Therefore, any organization tasked with the responsibility for homeland defense should include military support to the nation's counterdrug effort as one of its subordinate organizations. Since US Atlantic Command is already the headquarters for JTF-6, the major military organization responsible for coordinating military counterdrug support to civilian law enforcement agencies, it makes sense to give the homeland defense mission to US Atlantic Command. The chain of command is already established.

There is also room for an increase in personnel, preferably from the Army National Guard. Increasing the involvement of Army National Guard personnel in the nations' counterdrug effort should be a major consideration in future Army reviews of the roles and missions of its total force.

The Army National Guard consists of eight combat divisions that are considered part of our country's strategic reserve. Unlike other Army National Guard units, these divisions currently have no role in any existing DOD operations plan. In Army National Guard Vision 2010, the National Guard states that these units could be redesigned, equipped, and resourced for new missions if they could better serve the Total Army in other

capacities.⁴⁵ A number of these divisions could be dedicated to the mission of homeland defense, with command and control provided by US Atlantic Command. These divisions could be reconfigured to meet the nation's needs; maybe as Military Police, Intelligence, or Engineer units that could better support missions such as executing military counterdrug responsibilities. These units would also be available for other homeland defense missions such as countering weapons of mass destruction and combating terrorism. In all cases, the military should continue its role of supporting civilian agencies in addressing all of these issues.

This reorganization will provide a single military point of contact (US Atlantic Command) responsible for defense of our homeland. Given the proper resources (reconfigured and equipped Army National Guard divisions), the military could provide significant resources to counter the drug threat, especially in areas that are manpower intensive. For example, military personnel could assist US Customs personnel and US Border Patrol agents within the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), and at air, land, and sea ports of entry. According to Mr. William Mendel and Mr. Murl Munger, two well known experts on military involvement in counterdrug operations, "it is generally accepted that a majority of the illicit drugs entering the United States do so across the U.S. - Mexican border."⁴⁶ They go on to say, "...in any event, considerable quantities of cocaine and

heroin enter the United States through the Gulf Coast ports; Caribbean routes to Florida, Puerto Rico and the U. S. Virgin Islands; both east and west coast ports of entry and from Canada."⁴⁷ Given the expanse over which manpower resources must be dedicated to reduce the flow of drugs into the United States, establishing a Homeland Defense Command, with additional resources from the Army National Guard, as a minimum, could have a significant impact on the illegal flow of drugs across our borders.

Even without reconfiguring military support to the nation's counterdrug effort in a manner similar to the one discussed above, one thing is certain. The military plays a vital role in the nation's counterdrug effort, and should continue to do so in the future.

CONCLUSION

The five general goals of the 1998 National Drug Control Strategy and their thirty-two underlying objectives, the means by which the five goals or ways will be resourced, are all-encompassing stratagems that will provide the holistic approach needed to curb drug abuse in the future. These goals are long term and seek to balance efforts across the spectrum of counterdrug operations. They have both domestic and international implications. They effectively address the total involvement of local, state, national governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations in prevention, treatment, and education programs,

and delineate feasible national and international interdiction and supply-reduction efforts.

The personnel and equipment of the U.S. Armed Forces provide a valuable resource to effect a favorable outcome in at least two of the five overarching goals. They are: to shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat, and to break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply. In these days of constrained resources, it makes sense to attack the drug threat with all of the available elements of national power. The military has unique skills and equipment that provide a force multiplier in support of civilian law enforcement agencies as they prosecute the counterdrug effort. But as a nation, we can do more.

Militarily, we must realign our counterdrug forces under one command and provide that command the resources necessary to provide continuous and efficient support to civilian law enforcement agencies. The increased military support and greater emphasis by civilian law enforcement agencies will significantly reduce the flow of drugs into our country. Only then will we stand a better chance to significantly reduce the negative effects illegal drug use places on the sovereignty of our great nation.

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ENDNOTES

¹ The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997), i.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 10.

⁴ The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1998), 2-3.

⁵ A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997, 10.

⁶ The Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 2.

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⁸ A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998, 18.

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²⁰ Ibid., 8.

²¹ The State Department, Fact Sheet: Contending With Illegal Drugs at Home and Abroad (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 4 June 1998), 5-6.

²² Ibid., 3.

²³ Sandra Sobieraj, "Clinton Releases Anti-Drug Grants," 12 September 1998; available from

<<http://secure.northernlight.com/cgi-bin/paserv/cbrecid-EB19980912150000024>>; Internet; accessed 18 September 1998.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998, 1.

²⁶ Ibid., 5.

²⁷ Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 2.

²⁸ Ibid., 13.

²⁹ Rosenberger, 30.

³⁰ Ibid., 31.

³¹ Ibid.

³² "Chapter 22 - Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies," linked from United States Army War College at "CBNet Search," available from <<http://counterdrugin/orgs/usacis/org/pki/legal/oplaw/y-chpr22.htm>>; Internet; accessed 17 September 1998.

³³ Colin Powell, and Joseph E. Perisco, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books Publishing Group, 1995), 536.

³⁴ "The Drug Threat: Getting Priorities Straight," linked from United States Army War College at "CBNet Search," available from <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97/summer/munger.htm>>; Internet; accessed 26 October 1998.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Linda Kozaryn, "Counterdrug Mission Under Review," Soldiers 52 (October 1997): 28-29.

³⁷ "The Drug Threat: Getting Priorities Straight."

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ "Chapter 22 - Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies."

⁴⁰ "The Drug Threat: Getting Priorities Straight."

⁴¹ Kozaryn, 28-29.

⁴² Robert H. Dowd, The Enemy Is Us (Miami, Florida: The Hefty Press, 1997), 165.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Office of the Army National Guard, Army National Guard Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1998), 6.

⁴⁶ The Strategic Studies Institute, Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat, (Carlisle, PA: Publications and Production Office, August 1997), 5.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

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